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The University of Calgery 
1. I have long helieved that a primary datum for the se-
manticist of fiction is the syntactic (rather than lexical) 
ambiguity of fictional sentences. After all, it is true is 
it not, that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street, yet also 
true that he did no such thing? That we seem ready to ac-
quiesce without embarrassment in such apparent contradic-
tions suggests to me that they are indeed only apparent and 
that the appearance can be despatched by postulating ambi-
guity. So, then, though possessed of important pragmatic 
peculiarities, fictional discourse lays strong claim to a 
non-negligible semantic status; and the accommodating theo-
ries could be expected to articulate appropriate doctrines 
of reference, inference and truth. 
2. The surface "contradiction" that "Sherlock Holmes lived 
in Baker Street" is both true and not true requires clari-
fication and eventual disposal_in the theory of truth. If 
this is to be achieved by way of syntactic ambiguity, then 
the theory of truth needs to expound and regiment the ambi-
guity, of course; but it can also be expected to clarify 
the respects in which, if any, fictional pronouncements re-
fer, and the manner in which fictional surface contradic-
tions avoid authorization of the inference of everything 
whatever. So we may suppose that the theory of truth would 
give the lead to the theory of reference and the theory of 
inference. Truth theory would seem to be basic. 
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3. In some of my earlier work1, I attempted to find a se-
mantic framework for fictional discourse that answers to 
these various tasks. It is clear to me now, as it was in 
1974, that The Logic of Fiction did not give all the an-
swers and that it was far from perfect, even as far as it 
went and goes. It may now be timely to quickly review this 
theoretical sketch, with three main purposes in mind: 
(1) To take account of whatever virtues it may still 
possess. 
(2) To expose and develop its evident deficiencies. 
(3) To use it as a benchmark (though manifestly an imper-
fect onel against which rival theoretical perspectives 
may be compared and assessed. 
4. The theoretical sketch of The Logic of Fiction may be 
set out as follows: 
A basic semantic datum, I have said, is that fictional 
sentences give rise to apparent contradictions by which are, 
except in deliberately theoretical moments, not in the 
least disturbed. We say that "Sherlock Holmes lived in Ba-
ker Street" is both true and not true, yet we do not blush. 
There is an ambiguity somewhere that annuls the contradic-
tion and fully justifies our confident casualness. One way 
of representing the ambiguity is by assigning to "Sherlock 
Holmes lived in Baker Street", a pair of canonical repre-
sentatives S and ^O(S)1 in an appropriate semantic meta-
language in which S can be declared not true and rO(S)l 
true. '0' is a (kind of) modal operator on sentence repre-
sentations in the theory, the semantics of which should 
capture the truth theoretical peculiarities of fictional 
sentences. Ordinarily the operator '0' does not appear in 
the surface structure, in order that fictional sentences 
may achieve and preserve effective verlsimiltude. 
The truth theory for fictional sentences (or, more 
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precisely, for their canonical representations in the se-
mantic metalanguage) defines a satisfaction relation for 
sentences, from which, in turn, a truth definition can be 
got. Initially we say that a sentence 'o^) 1 meets the 
elementary sayso condition iff 
(S"l)[ r0 (.4,)1 represents a sentence that occurs in a work of 
fiction. And let us say that a sentence r0 (<J>} meets the 
author's sayso condition iff (S2) rO(if)1 meets the ele-
mentary sayso condition or 
IS31 <j> is a logical consequence of ip, \j/ is consistent,, 
and r0(*)1 meets the author's sayso condition. 
The basis of the definition of satisfaction of sen-
tence, 4> by a sequence, s, can now be given. 
•1. If <j> is r01^)1 meets the sayso condition, s satis-
fies ij>. The recursion clauses are as follows: Given that i)> 
does not meet 1, then 
2. Negation. If <J> is "of-i^l1 then s satisfies cf> iff 
there is a sentence r0(x)1 that is satisfied by S and 
no sequence satisfying x* fails to satisfy r i//*1 , where 
any sentence F * is exactly like the sentence P save 'for 
showing a free variable wherever P * displays a fictional 
name. 
3. Negation. If 4> is '-lOiif/)1, then 4 is satisfied by 
s iff r0 ( ) is not satisfied by s. 
4. -Conjunction. If ({i is r0(x1)1 and is r0 ( j)1 
then s satisfies '"iji&ij'1 iff s satisfies both <j> and iJj . 
5. Conjunction. If <j> is rO(Wx)" then s satisfies $ 
iff s satisfies r 0 U ) 1 and r0(x)"'. 
6. Implication. If 4> is г0(x1)', and iji is r0(x2)1 • 
then r<j>->i|)1 is satisfied by s iff s satisfies i|i or 
does not satisfy $. 
7. Implication. If $ is r0 (<j. '-*<|>)1 then s satisfies $ 
iff s satisfies some sentence r0(x11 and no sequence 
that satisfies x fails to satisfy r<t> '-»V . 
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8. Quantification. If ^ is r3 v.Ort)1 then $ is 
satisfied by s at least one of these conditions is 
met: 
(.il r0OH 1 contains free occurrences of the variable v. 
and v denotes the i-th element of some sequence s' dif-
fering from s in at most the i-th place, a is the name 
of that element and x is a substitution instance of 
r0 X1 with 
respect to a, and x meets the say so condition. 
tii). If 0 (.!(/) is rOtx (v. ,a) )"• , then v. denotes the I? "V 
i-th element of some sequence s' differing from s in at 
most i-th place; that element knows r o 9 (.v̂ . = a)1 to 
be true; the predicate x is such that in general 
fX ( v ., v,)1 is semantically equivalent to rv . believes ^ r- 1 ^ r 
that ^(.v^.jv^) is semantically equivalent to v. be-
lieves that rx lv Vj-)1? and • the element denoted by v. J n 1 
believes that rx(v^j a)1. 
9. Quantification. If $ is r0(3v(\|>))1 then 4> is sat-
isfied by s iff for some name or singular term a, free 
for a free variable in i|i, rO(S^(iJi) J1 is satisfied by s. 
A truth-definition now easily drops out. Truth is sat-
isfaction by every sequence. And truth, it should be noted, 
is governed by a single condition of material adequacy: 
(T) x is true iff y 
where x is the name of a sentence and y is the sentence 
.named or a translation of it in our theory's semantic meta-
language. In particular, "0 (Holmes lived in London)" is 
true if 0 (Holmes lived in London). 
Now, though it would be dreadfully cumbersome here to 
set forth the details, it can be seen that this semantic 
sketch has, or seems to have a number of advantages, 
ta) Condition 9 provides that "Moriarity discovered that 
Holmes really existed" is unsatisfiable, whereas "0 (Mori-
arity discovered that Holmes really existed)" is allowed 
to be satisfiable. 
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(.hi Conditions 8 and 9 allow for the representation of 
"Holmes had tea with Gladstone" by the harmless 
rO(T(h, gl)1, and of "Someone psychoanalyzed Grandiva" and 
"Someone loves Molly Jeavens" by the also harmless 
"3 vO0H v» 0 n the other hand, the theory will reject 
such sentences as "Pierre Trudeau waltzed with Molly 
Jeavens," as it righly should. 
(cl Conditions 2 and 3 concerning negation proyide that 
"OUI 1 and 0("1<j> 1 are neither contradictories nor con-
traries, which gives us a respectable method of represent-
ing the indeterminacy of fictional beings, if it were our 
wish to do so, without doing violence to the Law of Ex-
cluded Middle. What is more, a canonical representation in 
the form r0(.iji&lijil"1 is satisfiable, as is its implicandum 
r0(,t(i 1 & OCtyl1 . Since, r0(*)1 does not contradict 
rOCW>r , It is impossible to derive from r0(\|>&-)^)T, any 
sentence whatever; and an all-important contradiction prob 
lem is disposed of. 
(.dl There are methodological virtues, as well. The system 
of The Logic of Fiction. 
requires only the classical truth values, the 
semantic rudiments of first order systems, both 
referential and substitutional, - such items as 
sets, functions, substitution instances, and the 
like, a primitive alethic modality, possibility, 
and another primitive, 0, which is a very weak 
modal. Negatively speaking, for a theory of fic-
tion we do not need to depart the classical laws 
of Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle; we do 
not need to postulate the multivocality of 'true' 
or of 'exists' or of 'is in the world'; we do not 
need to abandon classical negation for some many-
valued interloper; we do not need many-valued 
composition logics; we do not need the neutral 
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quantifiers ' £ ' and • ir •. We can still win and lose 
bets concerning the whereabouts of Holmes: "0 (Holmes 
lived in Baker Street)" wins; "0 (Holmes lived in 
2 
Berczy Street)" loses . 
(e) And, finally, here is a theory of truth that does direct 
a certain amount of traffic in the theories of reference 
and inference. 
(i) Reference. That we refer in fiction to fictional ob-
jects could be accounted for by the legions of sentences in 
the form ""ot̂ v).1 and in the form r03 y î  vi that are 
assigned the truth-value T. That reference does not in such 
cases imply existence is conveyed by the unsatisfiability 
of such sentences as "3x(Sherlock Holmes = x)". 
(ii) Inference. Getting the truth conditions right goes 
quite some way, of course, in charting the course of what, 
in fiction, follows from what and what does not. Certainly 
one of the largest claims of the truth theory of The Logic 
of Fiction is that it shows convincingly not only how "con-
tradictions' can be true but also how they do not sanction 
that classical nuisance, the inference ex falso quodlibet. 
5. It is pleasant to have one's critics speak well one's 
work and to take it seriously. But an altogether more bene-
ficial outcome of criticism is the disclosure of problems 
and perplexities. Here are some that have been unearthed by 
critics of The Logic of Fiction. 
(a) Robert Howell The semantic theory of The Logic -of Fic-
tion does in fact, and contrary to my intentions, allow 
that "inconsistent fiction, contrary to fact, does narrate 
everything". Proof. To show that if r0 ).1 is in a 
given story, then so is r0 (1 (~li|i) )1 , for arbitrary . Let 
r0 C4>& I<f>)"" be in the story; hence it meets the elementary 
eayso condition and is satisfied by s. To show that 
•OPD-H) 1 is also satisfied by s, we use Negation rule 
2 as follows. There is a sentence r0(t}.«"!.}.)1 that is sat-
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isfied by s, and (vacuously) no sequence satisfying 
r(.<t>&"ty) falls to satisfy r~IOi|i), for any So ro'n(Hi))1 
is satisfied by s. 
4 
tb) Richard Routley Consider an authored self-contradiction 
represented as r0(.<|>&_l$)1 . Then the story containing such a 
sentence yields O(iji), for arbitrary Proof. Since 
r C4>). 3 ( a - X i s a classical tautology, we have it by 
the modality of 'O' that r0(.$&~)$)1 iff r0(,i|>«Tty). Thus we 
also have r0 t<P&~1<I>I1 , hence by «-distribution, r0 CV)1 # where 
f is any sentence you please. 
(cX Terence Parsons^ Formulas r3 (ip^ ,a)1 are taken to 
represent such fictional-real world truths as that "Someone 
psychoanalyzed Gradiva." The semantical rules of The Logic 
of Fiction provide that such a formula is (in the particular 
case before us), satisfied iff 
(i) v knows that 0 someone, w, is Gradiva. 
Cii). v believes that v psychoanalyzed Gradiva. 
(iiiX for all w and u, that w psychoanalyzed u is 
equivalent to w believes that w psychoanalyzed 
u. 
But it is not true, in particular, that "a psychoanalyzed b" 
is equivalent to "a believes that a psychoanalyzed b". It 
co'uld have happened that Freud psychoanalyzed Gradiva and 
yet was immediately thereafter struck down with irreversible 
amnesia; or he might have died. 
^ More importantly however, the rules utterly fail to ac-̂  
count for such sentences as "A certain fictional detective 
is more famous than any real detective". Here is a bet-sen-
sitive, indeed winning, asseveration, but it contains noth-
ing even resembling an intensional verb, as required By rule 
8 UiJL. 
6,' Trouble indeed for the semantic account of The Logic of 
fiction, perhaps even trouble enough to show that that en-
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terprise was Fundamentally misconceived and that we should 
pursue the semantics of fiction in very different theories, 
or even that we should abandon the semantic pretense al-
together and content ourselves with pragmatics- Let us see. 
A. Possible Worlds Semanticsi Pavel® Mature theories exist 
which give the semantics of possible worlds. True, some 
thinkers despair of a completely satisfying account of that 
powerful metaphor. Maximal sets of propositions have been 
put to the explicational test, and some still find it want-
ing, what with the notion of a proposition being no clearer 
than that of apossible world, or what with propositions be-
ing explicable only in terms of possible worlds. On the 
other hand, possible worlds semantics are certainly theoret-
ically better-behaved than the theory of The Logic of Fic-
tion; so would it not be preferable, if far from ideal, to 
look there? 
No, I think not. For I take it that the predicate, "is 
fictional", which. Holmes satisfies (.e.g., "OS-r(x •= Holmes 
& x is fictional)"X is governed by the following condi-
tion: 
'x is fictional' entails, for some possibly fx 
and Î j:. That is, a fictional object, x, satisfies some 
such modalized inconsistent predicate by virtue of this 
circumstance that had the author so chosen, x would have 
behaved inconsistently, and the author could have so chosen. 
Moreover, if we allow for some standard reduction postu-
lates for iterated modalities, we could obtain from rPos-
sibly "" ""Necessarily (Possibly ip)1, from which, in the 
particular instance, we would have, essentially as it were, 
the necessary possible self-contradictoriness of fictional 
beings. Fictional beings would be impossibilia, and not 
intuitively plausible candidates for residency in any pos-
sible world.7 
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Now, it is quite true that a major thrust of The Logic 
of Fiction was to show that such fictional contradictions 
were only apparent. But, Howell and Routley have rather con-
vincingly a.erred that the attempt failed. Therefore, show 
how the contradictoriness of fictional objects was "only" 
apparent, and how the derivation of everything whatever 
could be avoided. What is more, they would need to show that 
their solutions of such contradiction problems could be ab-
sorbed without theoretical violence into their possible 
world semantics. And finally, in order to show the advan-
tages of their theory over ray own, it would be required of 
them to show that their solutions of the contradiction prob-
lems could not, without theoretical violence, be absorbed 
into a theory of The Logic of Fiction sort. Tu quoque. g 
B. Meinongean Semantics: Parsons The best treatment of 
Meinongean semantics is that of Terence Parsons. One of its 
most useful features is that it has been very deliberately 
developed so as to provide an adequate theoretical home for 
fictional objects. However, for me there is an uncertainty 
about its analysis of fictional objects. Part of it has to 
do with the general notion of a Meinongean object. Parsons' 
account provides that corresponding to each different non-
empty set of properties there is a different specific ob-
ject. Some might find this an over-generous criterion of 
objecthood and others, might wonder whether, say, unit sets 
of ^properties are ever property-rich enough adequately to 
individuate. It depends I suppose on how close a connection 
there is between uniqueness and indiyiduatedness. For exam-
ple, there is no particular reason to think that there is 
just one object that is red and has no other (nuclear) prop-
erties; but corresponding to the set {being red} ¡.here is 
one object at most. So we have a problem with uniqueness. 
Moreover, regardless of whether the-red-only-thing is unique, 
it is dubious that redness alone ever makes a substantive 
enough contribution to its bearer so as to confer genuine 
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individuality upon it. My own complaint, however, is some-
what different. All objects, fictional or otherwise, are 
by virtue of their corresponding sets. Thus fictional ob-
jects "were objects before they were written about: they 
were so to speak only identified by the author, and writing 
about them did not confer objecthood upon them." So, then, 
the requirement that fictional objects be run-of-the-mill 
Meinongean objects as such denies us the intuition that in 
a rather deep, and somewhat literal sense, fictional objects 
have a literary paternity; i.e., that they are created by 
their authors. 
There is also something unsettling about the require-
ment that fictional objects should be incomplete in the man-
ner of Parsons' treatment'of this notion, that is, that 
they be indeterminate with respect to an enormous range of 
properties that one would have supposed them capable of 
exemplifying. On the face of it, it is not credible to say 
that Sherlock Holmes neither lacked nor possessed a kidney, 
ten toes, two elbows, or a mother; than he went to school 
or not, that he did not comport himself with Watson and the 
world in ways not chronicled by Doyle. Mind you, there are 
ever so many things about Holmes that we shall never know. 
But it is an over-reaction to elevate these insolubilia to 
ontological heights; it is a confusion of the ovdo essendi 
with the ordo oognosaendi. Perhaps it might be thought that 
I am wrong to suppose that on the Meinongean analysis Hol-
mes' incompleteness (epistemologically or ontologically 
rendered—it doesn't matter here) involve those properties 
of a few lines back. Nevertheless Holmes is a man. I would 
think that it would follow this, relative to elementary zo-
ology, that Holmes had a mother, and that relative to human 
anatomy, he had two elbows, a kidney and a certain number 
of toes. I would also think that having shoulders and back, 
that either he was be-moled or not. It may be a deficiency 
of sorts that Parsons' Meinongean preoccupation is with 
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ontology and not with logic. Parsons says that he does not 
seek for a logic of fiction. But if I am not to know what, 
follows about Holmes from what, I wonder whether the ontolo-
gical project can satisfactorily proceed. Let A be any pror 
position ascribing to Holmes any property not in his repre-
senting set. Parsons elects to assign to A. and to not-A 
as well, the intermediate truth value "indeterminate" or i. 
This leaves us with the need to make up our minds about 
A or not-A . Are we to assign it i or do we attach the 
classical truth-value T? If we make the former choice, we . 
abandon the law of excluded middle for fictional objects. 
If we go with the second option we tamper with the conven-
tional truth-functionality of the law. Either way, we invest 
our decision and the theory which it advances with a logical 
significance that needs to be explained and justified. 
Q 
3. PragmaticsPurtill Some authors have been tempted by 
the notion that the sentences actually constitutive of a 
piece of fiction (as opposed to those that are about fic-
tion, those that a literary critic might use, for example) 
are spared all but the limits of semantic significance, 
they are not true and they are not false, and that is about 
all there is to their semantic "theory"; the deeper truths 
lie elsewhere—in pragmatics. Purtill is one who has yielded 
to such a temptation, but not with wholly convincing re-
sults10. As I have said, Purtill holds that the sentences 
literally constitutive of a piece of fiction are neither 
true nor false, that they do not make assertions, that 
(.therefore) they do not make assertions about what they 
would appear to be about. Such sentences in fact tell tales, 
and in such non-assertive uses, they escape the burdens of 
all but the limits of semantic significance. That is, they 
are not true and they are not false. Purtill holds that if 
I tale-tell by means of a sentence, S, then S neither as-
serts nor denies anything,.and that it cannot be inferred 
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either that S is true or that S is false. Purtill makes two 
claims which it is useful to distinguish: 
(A) In fiction sentences are forwarded non-assertively. 
(B) Any sentence forwarded non-assertively is non-
It is, of course, open to us to accept (A) without accept-
ing (B). Proposition (B) is not obviously true, and some 
philosophers (Frege, for example, in "The Thought") have 
held that it is false. In particular, if a statement could 
be used unassertively, then tale-telling could perfectly 
well be the non-assertive presentation of statements; and I 
do not see why such statements couldn't be truth-valued, 
and why in such non-assertive uses we can't be said to be 
forgiven the obligation of staying on the semantics tracks. 
But what of what we ourselves say about fictional 
g; «.ngs-on, by way for example of literary criticism? Pur-
till thinks that, unlike the sentences constitutive of the 
fiction in question, these sentences do have some positive 
semantic significance, for they are true of false, and quite 
genuinely about something, of. which something quite genu-
inely is asserted. They have syntactic significance as well, 
for they are "ellipses" for sentences that are more faith-
fully rendered in the form: 
r (Doyle, his readers, "Holmes solved the case of 
the Speckled Band"), 
author, the author's audience or readership, and the non-
truth-valued, semantically bereft sentences with which the 
author makes his magic. 
In this particular example, we have more or less ob-
vious facts to take into account. 
1. In this fashion, Doyle has tale-told us that Holmes 
solved the case of the Speckled Band. 
2. Statement 1 is true ("straightforwardly true" as Profes-
sor Purtill might say). 
truth-valued. 
where with, as arguments, and 
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3. The sentence "Holmes solved the case of the Speckled 
Band" makes a false assertion. 
4. What was tale-told would make a false assertion; *-.hat 
is, what Doyle tale-tells, but does not assert, would make 
a false assertion. 
Consider now the following inconsistent set: 
(•£) What Doyle tale-told, is X. 
(ii) What Woods (say) non-elliptically asserted is 
Y. 
(Hi) What Doyle tale-told is neither true nor false. 
(iv) What Woods non-elliptically asserted is false. 
(v) 'X' = 'i". 
I think that we can quickly agree that Purtill is committed 
to the rejection of (v), for he would appear expressly to 
hold (i)-(iv). Suppose then that (v) is rejected. Then, 
though 1X* and 'Y' are the same sentence, 'X' was put to 
non-assertive, non-truth-valued purposes, and 'Y' to asser-
tive, truth-valued purposes. The similarity is syntactic 
only. But, if so, it is unsurpassingly unclear (to me at 
least) whether the predicate in "X! and ' Y' predicates the 
same thing, and unclear, as well, whether their common sub-
ject term has any, never mind whether it be the same, se-
mantic role (e.g., does it refer to Holmes?). What, then, 
accounts for the urge in us all to think that the author's 
"Holmes scolded Watson" and the critic's "Holmes scolded 
Watson" show a common concern for Watson? 
Purtill's views, perhaps like my own in The Logic of 
Fiction, rather quickly prove unconvincing. I do not, how-
ever, for a moment suppose that the difficulties with 
Purtill's pragmatic reconstruction indicate that the prag-
matic approach is wrong in principle1'''. But I do think that 
the possible world and Mainongean approaches are wrong in 
principle; and about the approach of The Logic of Fiction 
I remain, for the time being at least, undecided and more 
baffled than I care to admit. 
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